1. India is not a military goliath in relation to Pakistan in the way Israel is to the Palestinian territories. India does not have the immunity, the confidence and the military free hand that result from an overwhelming military superiority over an opponent. Israel's foe is a non-sovereign entity that enjoys the most precarious form of self-governance. Pakistan, for all its dysfunction, is a proper country with a proper army, superior by far to the tin-pot Arab forces that Israel has had to combat over time. Pakistan has nukes, to boot. Any assault on Pakistani territory carries with it an apocalyptic risk for India. This is, in fact, Pakistan's trump card. (This explains, also, why Israel is determined to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran.)
2. Even if India could attack Pakistan without fear of nuclear retaliation, the rationale for "doing a Gaza" is, arguably, not fully present: Israel had been attacked consistently by the very force--Hamas--that was in political control of the territory from which the attacks occurred. By contrast, terrorist attacks on India, while originating in Pakistan, are not authored by the Pakistani government. India can-- and does--contend that Pakistan's government should shut down the terrorist training camps on Pakistani soil. (In this insistence, India has unequivocal support from Washington.) Yet only a consistent and demonstrable pattern of dereliction by Pakistani authorities-- which would need to be dereliction verging on complicity with the terrorists--would furnish India with sufficient grounds to hold the Pakistani state culpable.
3. As our columnist, Karlyn Bowman, writes, Israel enjoys impressive support from the American people, in contrast to the Palestinians. No other state--apart, perhaps, from Britain--evokes as much favor in American public opinion as does Israel. This is not merely the result of the much-vaunted "Israel lobby" (to use a label deployed by its detractors), but also because of the very real depth of cultural interpenetration between American and Israeli society. This fraternal feeling buys Israel an enviable immunity in the conduct of its strategic defense. India, by contrast--while considerably more admired and favored in American public opinion than Pakistan--enjoys scarcely a fraction of Israel's "pull" in Washington when it comes to questions of the use of force beyond its borders.
4. Pakistan is strategically significant to the United States; the Palestinians are not. This gives Washington scant incentive to rein in the Israelis, but a major incentive to rein in any Indian impulse to strike at Pakistan. However justified the Indian anger against Pakistan over the recent invasion of Mumbai by Pakistani terrorists, the last thing that the U.S. wants right now is an attack--no matter how surgical--by India against Pakistan-based terror camps. This would almost certainly result in a wholesale shift of Pakistani troops away from their western, Afghan front toward the eastern boundary with India--and would leave the American Afghan campaign in some considerable disarray, at least in the short term. So Washington has asked for, and received, the gift of Indian patience. And although India recognizes that it is not wholly without options to mobilize quickly for punitive, surgical strikes in a "strategic space," it would--right now--settle for a trial of the accused terrorist leaders in U.S. courts. (Seven U.S. citizens were killed in Mumbai: Under U.S. law, those responsible--and this should include Pakistani intelligence masterminds--have to be brought to justice.)
Friday, December 3, 2010
Why the Indian army can’t attack Pakistan
* Bharati missile failure: The truth is out of the bag
* Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor’s epiphany
If the analysis by the Indian authors is to be belived, the Indian army is not in a state to confront Pakistan. That is the reason it did not attack Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks. Pranab Mukherjee, Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh had all threatened Pakistan with war–and now threaten Pakistan by not showing up for peace negotiations. Mr. Siddharth Srivastava discusses the reasons why Bharat did not attack Pakistan after Mumbai.
The idea of becoming subservient to India is abhorrent and that of cooperation with India with object of promoting tension with China equally repugnant. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
* The Hydrogen Bombs of South Asia?
* India envious of Pakistan nukes–jittery about Pakistan Plutonium capability
The Sorry State of the Indian Army, January 21, 2009
India ready for war? Forces grapple with delays, red tape, Rajan Pandit | Times of India
NEW DELHI: For all its aspirations about becoming a superpower, India continues to fumble in formulating strategic plans to systematically build the country’s military “capabilities” in tune with its geopolitical objectives.
For one, the government is yet to finalise the 11th Defence Plan (2007-2012) due to wrangling between the finance and defence ministries. For another, similar is the fate of the much-touted LTIPP-2007-2022 (long-term integrated perspective plan) till now, say sources.
“Successive governments have failed to formulate budgetary plans with a concrete strategic underpinning,” said a top official. India does spend a lot on arms deals but it happens in a haphazard manner, without clear prioritisation, and is dogged by huge delays.
* Pakistan’s robust Nuclear & Missile prowess growing fast–US scientists
* Indian “Nuclear” Duds: Scientists question Kalam’s credentials-confirm fizzle
India’s defence expenditure, of course, has also fallen below 2% of its GDP for the first time in decades this fiscal despite military experts demanding at least 3%. Even as UPA government now belatedly fast-tracks procurement of military hardware and software in wake of 26/11, here’s a look at some of the gaps in military capabilities:
Nuclear Deterrence: India has Agni missiles as well as fighters to deliver nukes but no nuclear-powered submarines armed with nuclear-tipped missiles. The “nuclear triad” is still some four years away from completion, with the 25-year-old indigenous programme to build nuclear subs under the ATV (advanced technology vessel) project yet to come to fruition.
Submarines: To China’s 57 attack submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, India has just 16 aging diesel-electric submarines, with huge serviceability problems. Only half of Navy’s 10 Russian Kilo-class, four German HDW and two virtually-obsolete Foxtrot submarines are operationally available. The Rs 18,798-crore Scorpene project will deliver six submarines only between 2012 and 2017. Pakistan, meanwhile, is building its submarine arm, inducting three French Agosta-90B vessels.
Fighters: Airpower may be decisive during wars but IAF continues to grapple with a free-fall in its fighter squadrons, down to 32 from its sanctioned strength of 39.5. Though 44 squadrons are needed to meet “a full conflict” with Pakistan, while maintaining “a dissuasive posture” against China, IAF will reach the 39.5 mark only by 2017. Delays in both the indigenous Tejas Light Combat Aircraft as well as the procurement process for 126 new multi-role combat fighters in the $10.4 billion project has led to this situation.
Artillery: The Bofors ghost has derailed Army’s artillery modernisation plan, valued to be well over Rs 15,000 crore. There has been no induction of big guns since the 1986 procurement of 410 Bofors 155mm/39-calibre howitzers. Army wants to induct 400 155mm/52-calibre towed guns, with another 1,100 of them to be manufactured indigenously, in a Rs 8,000-crore project; 180 wheeled self-propelled howitzers for around Rs 4,700 crore; 140 air-mobile ultra-light howitzers for around Rs 2,900 crore.
Night-Fighting: Army, in particular, requires a strong dose of third-generation thermal imaging sights and night-vision devices. It wants to equip all its tanks, which include 1,200 T-72 tanks, with solid NF capabilities by around 2010-2011.
Aircraft Carriers: Navy has long demanded three carriers but it does not have even one operating at present since the ageing 28,000-tonne INS Viraat is currently undergoing another life-extension refit to ensure it can run for five more years. Indian army ‘backed out’ of Pakistan attack. Siddharth Srivastava | Asia Times
NEW DELHI – Reluctance for battle by an ill-prepared army could have resulted in India not launching an attack on Pakistan in the aftermath of the Pakistan-linked terror attack in the Indian city of Mumbai on November 26 in which nearly 200 people died.
High-level government sources have told Asia Times Online that army commanders impressed on the political leadership in New Delhi that an inadequate and obsolete arsenal at their disposal mitigated against an all-out war.
The navy and air force, however, had given the government the go-ahead about their preparedness to carry out an attack and repulse any retaliation from Pakistan.
Over the past few weeks, it has become increasingly apparent from top officials in the know that the closed-door meetings of top military commanders and political leaders discussed the poor state of the armory (both ammunition and artillery), and that this tilted the balance in favor of not striking at Pakistan.
According to senior officials, following the attack on Mumbai by 10 militants linked to Pakistan, India’s top leadership looked at two options closely – war and hot pursuit. Largely for the reasons cited above, the notion of an all-out war was rejected. Hot pursuit, however, remains very much on the table.
The government sources say that a framework for covert operations is being put in place, although India will continue to deny such actions. Crack naval, air and army forces backed by federal intelligence agencies will be involved. The target areas will be Pakistan-administered Kashmir and areas along the Punjab, such as Multan, where some of the Mumbai attackers are believed to have been recruited.
The coastal belt from the southern port city of Karachi to Gwadar in Balochistan province will also be under active Indian surveillance.
Thumbs down to war
Following the Mumbai attack, New Delhi’s inclination was to launch a quick strike against Pakistan to impress domestic opinion, and then be prepared for a short war, given the pressures that would be exercised by international powers for a ceasefire to prevent nuclear war breaking out.
The expectation of New Delhi was that the war would go beyond the traditional skirmishes involving artillery fire that take place at the Kashmir border, essentially to check infiltration by militants, or the brief but bloody exchanges at Kargil in 1999.
It was in this context that the army made it apparent that it was not equipped to fight such a war, given the military’s presence along the eastern Chinese borders, and that India was at risk of ceding territory should an instant ceasefire be brokered with Pakistan.
This would have been highly embarrassing, not to mention political suicide for the Congress-led government in an election year. So instead, New Delhi restricted itself to a strident diplomatic offensive that continues to date, and the option of hot pursuit.
The air force, on the other hand, was confident that it was prepared to take on the first retaliatory action by Pakistan, expected at forward air force bases along India’s borders in Rajasthan, Gujarat and Indian-administered Kashmir. The role of the navy in the operations was not clearly defined, but it was to cover from the Arabian Sea.Not ready to fight
Various experts, former generals and independent reports have voiced concern over the past few years about the state of preparedness of the Indian army.
For example, the Bofors gun scandal of the 1980s stymied the army’s artillery modernization plan, with no induction of powerful guns since the 1986 purchase of 410 Bofors 155mm/39-caliber howitzers. The army has been trying to introduce 400 such guns from abroad and another 1,100 manufactured domestically, without success.
The latest report by the independent Comptroller and Auditor General said the state’s production of 23mm ammunition for Shilka anti-aircraft cannons and 30mm guns mounted on infantry combat vehicles lacked quality. Further, supply was nearly 35% short of requirements.
India’s huge tank fleet is in bad shape due to a shortage of Russian spare parts, while indigenous efforts, such as the main battle tank Arjun, have failed.
Signs of trouble emerged during the Kargil war when it was revealed that India’s defense forces were dealing with acute shortages in every sphere.
In remarks that underscored the problems, the then-army chief, V P Malik, said his forces would make do with whatever was in hand, given the fears of a full-scale war that was eventually avoided due to pressure by America, then under president Bill Clinton.
The Kargil review committee report noted, “The heavy involvement of the army in counter-insurgency operations cannot but affect its preparedness for its primary role, which is to defend the country against external aggression.”Although there have been attempts to hasten India’s overall defense modernization program, estimated at over US$50 billion over the next five years, gaping holes need to be plugged, including corruption and massive delays in the defense procurement processes.
India’s defense expenditure has dipped below 2% of gross domestic product for the first time in decades, despite experts pegging 3% as adequate.
Other defense arms are in dire need of enhancement. Fighter jet squadrons are much below required strength, while the bidding process for medium fighter planes has only just begun and may take a few years to complete.
Meanwhile, the prospects of an India-Pakistan conflict are not over. India’s army chief, General Deepak Kapoor, said last week that Pakistan had redeployed troops from its Afghan border to the western frontier with India. “The Indian army has factored this in its planning,” Kapoor said.
Siddharth Srivastava is a New Delhi-based journalist. He can be reached at sidsri@yahoo.com.
All of Indi’a Rockets have failed. 1) Agni 2) Pirthivi 3) Akash 4) Trishul and 5) Nag 6) Agni consisting of surface to surface surface to air and anti-tank systems.
Prithvi: Failure: To date the only reliable delivery system inducted is the Pirthvi missile with a range of 300 kilometres. The subsequent versions of this missile are still undergoing tests. The pride of India the Agni missile tested last time landed 200 kilometres off target.
Akash: Failure: After several years of testing has been shelved for reasons best known to the Indians. Akash was meant as a substitute for Pechora. On the Akash missile, which was the subject of the DRDO media conference here on Tuesday, former air chief S. P. Tyagi said:“Akash was to be ready at a certain time, but it wasn’t. I had to change everything to make up for the delay.” Both missiles were part of a programme to develop indigenous weapons, which began in July 1983, with plans for Agni, Prithvi, Trishul, Akash and Nag missiles.
Trishul: Failure: Trishul is being replaced by Israeli Barak and Russian systems.
The IAF, for instance, has aging Pechora, Igla-1M and OSA-AK missile systems, and that, too, in woefully inadequate numbers.
While Trishul was to replace its OSA-AK weapons system, Akash was meant as a substitute for Pechora.
But both the Trishul and Akash air defence missile systems, which are part of the original Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme launched as far back as 1983, have been dogged by development snags in their “command guidance and integrated Ramjet rocket propulsion” systems.
Trishul, for instance, has been tested over 80 times so far without coming anywhere near becoming operational. It was, in fact, virtually given up for dead in 2003 after around Rs 300 crore was spent on it, before being revived yet again.
Trishul’s repeated failure, in fact, forced the Navy to go in for nine Israeli Barak anti-missile defence systems for its frontline warships, along with 200 Barak missiles, at a cost of Rs 1,510 crore during the 1999 Kargil conflict. The Navy is now inducting even more Barak systems due to Trishul’s continued failure.
Speaking of the Trishul surface-to-air missile that has now been termed a technology demonstrator, former naval chief Sushil Kumar said:“It was a national embarrassment. DRDO made fake claims for 25 years. In the 1999 Kargil conflict, the navy was vulnerable to attacks from Pakistan’s Harpoon.
“Finally the project was scrapped when the navy went in for the Israeli Barak missiles. The Prithvi’s naval variant, Dhanush, is also flawed and ill-conceived, which is being inflicted on the navy.”Indian missile system started back in the 50s on a five folder programme namely:
Nag: Failure: The Nag proved to be as deadily as the Holy Cow.
Agni: Failure: The Agni-I (range 700 to 800 kilometers) and Agni-II were both products of India’s space program and connected to its Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), itself launched in 1983. Originally, their design used a satellite space-launching rocket (SLV-3) as the first stage, on top of which was mounted the very short-range (150 to 250 kilometers) liquid fuel-propelled Prithvi missile.
The Agni-III’s brand new design, in which both stages use solid propellants, was to enable it to carry a payload weighing up to 1.5 tons and deliver it to targets as far away as Beijing and Shanghai. At present, India lacks an effective nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis China, based on a delivery vehicle carrying a nuclear warhead. Agni-III was meant to fill the void.
The failure of the Agni III was in some ways more serious because it exposed the political limitations of India’s attempts, despite its ambitions, to pursue a military capability which is truly independent of the US’s strategic calculations.
The surface-to-surface ballistic missile, designed to have a range of 3,500 kilometers, took off in a “fairly smooth” manner at the designated hour. But “a series of mishaps” occurred in its later flight path.
The Agni-III was originally meant to be tested in 2003-04. However, the test was postponed owing to technological snags. After their rectification, said reports, the missile’s test flights were put off twice largely for “political reasons”, so as not to annoy the US.
Earlier this year, India decided to postpone the missile test out of fear that a test could hamper US Congressional ratification of the India-US nuclear cooperation deal. Publicly, the Indian defense minister cited “self-imposed restraint” to justify the postponement.
The Indian missile met a disaster as it could not attain the altitude where the first stage is over or the second is even ignited.
He disputed the Indian claim, saying that with the range of 3,500 km, the missile had to go above about 800-900 km while the second stage had to be ignited at 28 to 30 km.
‘If the missile fell from the height of 12 km, it establishes that either it’s motor rocket, the basics of the missile proved failure or the guidance and control system was faulty. In both the probabilities, Indian technology has been exposed in clumsy manners.’
‘It is interesting to watch that Indian missile programme that was initiated by French and US assistance and later New Delhi also borrowed Russian technical support has been facing tragedies from the beginning,’ the newspaper quoted him as saying.
* Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor’s epiphany
If the analysis by the Indian authors is to be belived, the Indian army is not in a state to confront Pakistan. That is the reason it did not attack Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks. Pranab Mukherjee, Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh had all threatened Pakistan with war–and now threaten Pakistan by not showing up for peace negotiations. Mr. Siddharth Srivastava discusses the reasons why Bharat did not attack Pakistan after Mumbai.
The idea of becoming subservient to India is abhorrent and that of cooperation with India with object of promoting tension with China equally repugnant. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
* The Hydrogen Bombs of South Asia?
* India envious of Pakistan nukes–jittery about Pakistan Plutonium capability
The Sorry State of the Indian Army, January 21, 2009
India ready for war? Forces grapple with delays, red tape, Rajan Pandit | Times of India
NEW DELHI: For all its aspirations about becoming a superpower, India continues to fumble in formulating strategic plans to systematically build the country’s military “capabilities” in tune with its geopolitical objectives.
For one, the government is yet to finalise the 11th Defence Plan (2007-2012) due to wrangling between the finance and defence ministries. For another, similar is the fate of the much-touted LTIPP-2007-2022 (long-term integrated perspective plan) till now, say sources.
“Successive governments have failed to formulate budgetary plans with a concrete strategic underpinning,” said a top official. India does spend a lot on arms deals but it happens in a haphazard manner, without clear prioritisation, and is dogged by huge delays.
* Pakistan’s robust Nuclear & Missile prowess growing fast–US scientists
* Indian “Nuclear” Duds: Scientists question Kalam’s credentials-confirm fizzle
India’s defence expenditure, of course, has also fallen below 2% of its GDP for the first time in decades this fiscal despite military experts demanding at least 3%. Even as UPA government now belatedly fast-tracks procurement of military hardware and software in wake of 26/11, here’s a look at some of the gaps in military capabilities:
Nuclear Deterrence: India has Agni missiles as well as fighters to deliver nukes but no nuclear-powered submarines armed with nuclear-tipped missiles. The “nuclear triad” is still some four years away from completion, with the 25-year-old indigenous programme to build nuclear subs under the ATV (advanced technology vessel) project yet to come to fruition.
Submarines: To China’s 57 attack submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, India has just 16 aging diesel-electric submarines, with huge serviceability problems. Only half of Navy’s 10 Russian Kilo-class, four German HDW and two virtually-obsolete Foxtrot submarines are operationally available. The Rs 18,798-crore Scorpene project will deliver six submarines only between 2012 and 2017. Pakistan, meanwhile, is building its submarine arm, inducting three French Agosta-90B vessels.
Fighters: Airpower may be decisive during wars but IAF continues to grapple with a free-fall in its fighter squadrons, down to 32 from its sanctioned strength of 39.5. Though 44 squadrons are needed to meet “a full conflict” with Pakistan, while maintaining “a dissuasive posture” against China, IAF will reach the 39.5 mark only by 2017. Delays in both the indigenous Tejas Light Combat Aircraft as well as the procurement process for 126 new multi-role combat fighters in the $10.4 billion project has led to this situation.
Artillery: The Bofors ghost has derailed Army’s artillery modernisation plan, valued to be well over Rs 15,000 crore. There has been no induction of big guns since the 1986 procurement of 410 Bofors 155mm/39-calibre howitzers. Army wants to induct 400 155mm/52-calibre towed guns, with another 1,100 of them to be manufactured indigenously, in a Rs 8,000-crore project; 180 wheeled self-propelled howitzers for around Rs 4,700 crore; 140 air-mobile ultra-light howitzers for around Rs 2,900 crore.
Night-Fighting: Army, in particular, requires a strong dose of third-generation thermal imaging sights and night-vision devices. It wants to equip all its tanks, which include 1,200 T-72 tanks, with solid NF capabilities by around 2010-2011.
Aircraft Carriers: Navy has long demanded three carriers but it does not have even one operating at present since the ageing 28,000-tonne INS Viraat is currently undergoing another life-extension refit to ensure it can run for five more years. Indian army ‘backed out’ of Pakistan attack. Siddharth Srivastava | Asia Times
NEW DELHI – Reluctance for battle by an ill-prepared army could have resulted in India not launching an attack on Pakistan in the aftermath of the Pakistan-linked terror attack in the Indian city of Mumbai on November 26 in which nearly 200 people died.
High-level government sources have told Asia Times Online that army commanders impressed on the political leadership in New Delhi that an inadequate and obsolete arsenal at their disposal mitigated against an all-out war.
The navy and air force, however, had given the government the go-ahead about their preparedness to carry out an attack and repulse any retaliation from Pakistan.
Over the past few weeks, it has become increasingly apparent from top officials in the know that the closed-door meetings of top military commanders and political leaders discussed the poor state of the armory (both ammunition and artillery), and that this tilted the balance in favor of not striking at Pakistan.
According to senior officials, following the attack on Mumbai by 10 militants linked to Pakistan, India’s top leadership looked at two options closely – war and hot pursuit. Largely for the reasons cited above, the notion of an all-out war was rejected. Hot pursuit, however, remains very much on the table.
The government sources say that a framework for covert operations is being put in place, although India will continue to deny such actions. Crack naval, air and army forces backed by federal intelligence agencies will be involved. The target areas will be Pakistan-administered Kashmir and areas along the Punjab, such as Multan, where some of the Mumbai attackers are believed to have been recruited.
The coastal belt from the southern port city of Karachi to Gwadar in Balochistan province will also be under active Indian surveillance.
Thumbs down to war
Following the Mumbai attack, New Delhi’s inclination was to launch a quick strike against Pakistan to impress domestic opinion, and then be prepared for a short war, given the pressures that would be exercised by international powers for a ceasefire to prevent nuclear war breaking out.
The expectation of New Delhi was that the war would go beyond the traditional skirmishes involving artillery fire that take place at the Kashmir border, essentially to check infiltration by militants, or the brief but bloody exchanges at Kargil in 1999.
It was in this context that the army made it apparent that it was not equipped to fight such a war, given the military’s presence along the eastern Chinese borders, and that India was at risk of ceding territory should an instant ceasefire be brokered with Pakistan.
This would have been highly embarrassing, not to mention political suicide for the Congress-led government in an election year. So instead, New Delhi restricted itself to a strident diplomatic offensive that continues to date, and the option of hot pursuit.
The air force, on the other hand, was confident that it was prepared to take on the first retaliatory action by Pakistan, expected at forward air force bases along India’s borders in Rajasthan, Gujarat and Indian-administered Kashmir. The role of the navy in the operations was not clearly defined, but it was to cover from the Arabian Sea.Not ready to fight
Various experts, former generals and independent reports have voiced concern over the past few years about the state of preparedness of the Indian army.
For example, the Bofors gun scandal of the 1980s stymied the army’s artillery modernization plan, with no induction of powerful guns since the 1986 purchase of 410 Bofors 155mm/39-caliber howitzers. The army has been trying to introduce 400 such guns from abroad and another 1,100 manufactured domestically, without success.
The latest report by the independent Comptroller and Auditor General said the state’s production of 23mm ammunition for Shilka anti-aircraft cannons and 30mm guns mounted on infantry combat vehicles lacked quality. Further, supply was nearly 35% short of requirements.
India’s huge tank fleet is in bad shape due to a shortage of Russian spare parts, while indigenous efforts, such as the main battle tank Arjun, have failed.
Signs of trouble emerged during the Kargil war when it was revealed that India’s defense forces were dealing with acute shortages in every sphere.
In remarks that underscored the problems, the then-army chief, V P Malik, said his forces would make do with whatever was in hand, given the fears of a full-scale war that was eventually avoided due to pressure by America, then under president Bill Clinton.
The Kargil review committee report noted, “The heavy involvement of the army in counter-insurgency operations cannot but affect its preparedness for its primary role, which is to defend the country against external aggression.”Although there have been attempts to hasten India’s overall defense modernization program, estimated at over US$50 billion over the next five years, gaping holes need to be plugged, including corruption and massive delays in the defense procurement processes.
India’s defense expenditure has dipped below 2% of gross domestic product for the first time in decades, despite experts pegging 3% as adequate.
Other defense arms are in dire need of enhancement. Fighter jet squadrons are much below required strength, while the bidding process for medium fighter planes has only just begun and may take a few years to complete.
Meanwhile, the prospects of an India-Pakistan conflict are not over. India’s army chief, General Deepak Kapoor, said last week that Pakistan had redeployed troops from its Afghan border to the western frontier with India. “The Indian army has factored this in its planning,” Kapoor said.
Siddharth Srivastava is a New Delhi-based journalist. He can be reached at sidsri@yahoo.com.
All of Indi’a Rockets have failed. 1) Agni 2) Pirthivi 3) Akash 4) Trishul and 5) Nag 6) Agni consisting of surface to surface surface to air and anti-tank systems.
Prithvi: Failure: To date the only reliable delivery system inducted is the Pirthvi missile with a range of 300 kilometres. The subsequent versions of this missile are still undergoing tests. The pride of India the Agni missile tested last time landed 200 kilometres off target.
Akash: Failure: After several years of testing has been shelved for reasons best known to the Indians. Akash was meant as a substitute for Pechora. On the Akash missile, which was the subject of the DRDO media conference here on Tuesday, former air chief S. P. Tyagi said:“Akash was to be ready at a certain time, but it wasn’t. I had to change everything to make up for the delay.” Both missiles were part of a programme to develop indigenous weapons, which began in July 1983, with plans for Agni, Prithvi, Trishul, Akash and Nag missiles.
Trishul: Failure: Trishul is being replaced by Israeli Barak and Russian systems.
The IAF, for instance, has aging Pechora, Igla-1M and OSA-AK missile systems, and that, too, in woefully inadequate numbers.
While Trishul was to replace its OSA-AK weapons system, Akash was meant as a substitute for Pechora.
But both the Trishul and Akash air defence missile systems, which are part of the original Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme launched as far back as 1983, have been dogged by development snags in their “command guidance and integrated Ramjet rocket propulsion” systems.
Trishul, for instance, has been tested over 80 times so far without coming anywhere near becoming operational. It was, in fact, virtually given up for dead in 2003 after around Rs 300 crore was spent on it, before being revived yet again.
Trishul’s repeated failure, in fact, forced the Navy to go in for nine Israeli Barak anti-missile defence systems for its frontline warships, along with 200 Barak missiles, at a cost of Rs 1,510 crore during the 1999 Kargil conflict. The Navy is now inducting even more Barak systems due to Trishul’s continued failure.
Speaking of the Trishul surface-to-air missile that has now been termed a technology demonstrator, former naval chief Sushil Kumar said:“It was a national embarrassment. DRDO made fake claims for 25 years. In the 1999 Kargil conflict, the navy was vulnerable to attacks from Pakistan’s Harpoon.
“Finally the project was scrapped when the navy went in for the Israeli Barak missiles. The Prithvi’s naval variant, Dhanush, is also flawed and ill-conceived, which is being inflicted on the navy.”Indian missile system started back in the 50s on a five folder programme namely:
Nag: Failure: The Nag proved to be as deadily as the Holy Cow.
Agni: Failure: The Agni-I (range 700 to 800 kilometers) and Agni-II were both products of India’s space program and connected to its Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), itself launched in 1983. Originally, their design used a satellite space-launching rocket (SLV-3) as the first stage, on top of which was mounted the very short-range (150 to 250 kilometers) liquid fuel-propelled Prithvi missile.
The Agni-III’s brand new design, in which both stages use solid propellants, was to enable it to carry a payload weighing up to 1.5 tons and deliver it to targets as far away as Beijing and Shanghai. At present, India lacks an effective nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis China, based on a delivery vehicle carrying a nuclear warhead. Agni-III was meant to fill the void.
The failure of the Agni III was in some ways more serious because it exposed the political limitations of India’s attempts, despite its ambitions, to pursue a military capability which is truly independent of the US’s strategic calculations.
The surface-to-surface ballistic missile, designed to have a range of 3,500 kilometers, took off in a “fairly smooth” manner at the designated hour. But “a series of mishaps” occurred in its later flight path.
The Agni-III was originally meant to be tested in 2003-04. However, the test was postponed owing to technological snags. After their rectification, said reports, the missile’s test flights were put off twice largely for “political reasons”, so as not to annoy the US.
Earlier this year, India decided to postpone the missile test out of fear that a test could hamper US Congressional ratification of the India-US nuclear cooperation deal. Publicly, the Indian defense minister cited “self-imposed restraint” to justify the postponement.
The Indian missile met a disaster as it could not attain the altitude where the first stage is over or the second is even ignited.
He disputed the Indian claim, saying that with the range of 3,500 km, the missile had to go above about 800-900 km while the second stage had to be ignited at 28 to 30 km.
‘If the missile fell from the height of 12 km, it establishes that either it’s motor rocket, the basics of the missile proved failure or the guidance and control system was faulty. In both the probabilities, Indian technology has been exposed in clumsy manners.’
‘It is interesting to watch that Indian missile programme that was initiated by French and US assistance and later New Delhi also borrowed Russian technical support has been facing tragedies from the beginning,’ the newspaper quoted him as saying.
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